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Abstract 
We discuss the two moments of human cognition, namely, apprehension (A),whereby a 
coherent perception emerges from the recruitment of neuronal groups, and judgment(B),that entails 
the comparison of two apprehensions acquired at different times, coded in a suitable language and 
retrieved by memory. (B) entails self-consciousness, in so far as the agent who expresses the 
judgment must be aware that the two apprehensions are submitted to his/her own scrutiny and that it 
is his/her task to extract a mutual relation. Since (B) lasts around 3 seconds, the semantic value of 
the pieces under comparison must be decided within that time. This implies a fast search of the 
memory contents. 
As a fact, exploring human subjects with sequences of simple words, we find evidence of a limited 
time window , corresponding to the memory retrieval of a linguistic item in order to match it with 
the next one in a text flow (be it literary, or musical,or figurative). 
While apprehension is globally explained as a Bayes inference, judgment tresults from an inverse 
Bayes inference. As a consequence, two hermeneutics emerge (called respectively circle and coil). 
The first one acts in a pre-assigned space of features. The second one provides the discovery of 
novel features, thus unveiling previously unknown aspects and  hence representing the road to 
reality. 
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1-Perception, judgment and self-consciousness 
Figs 1 and 2 introduce the difference between A-apprehension or perception that rules the motor 
reactions of any brainy animal, and B-language ,only humans, and that provides judgments. 
                                     
Fig.1-Plato said that we see the shadows of things, like a prisoner constrained to view the end of a 
cave and forbidden to turn and see the outside world. This occurs indeed in perceptual tasks, where 
the sensorial stimuli are interpreted by “algorithms” and generate (within1 sec) a motor reaction. 
The procedure is common to all brainy animals. 
                             
Fig.2- In linguistic operations, humans code a perception in a linguistic code andretrieve it by short 
term memory (around 3 sec)comparing it to a successive coded perception. From the comparisonit 
emerges a connection  that increases the details of the observed thing.  
 
Figs 3 and 4  show why the scientific program is a linguistic one and what is the reason of its 
success. 
With this in mind, we explore whether and how Cognition unveils Reality .. 
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Following the philosophy of cognition of  Bernard Lonergan [Lonergan], I discuss two distinct 
moments of human cognition, namely, apprehension (A) whereby a coherent perception emerges 
from the recruitment of neuronal groups, and judgment (B) whereby memory recalls previous (A) 
units coded in a suitable language;  these units are compared and from comparison it follows the 
formulation of a judgment. 
The first moment, (A), has a duration around 1 sec; its associated neuronal correlate consists of the 
synchronization of the EEG (electro-encephalo-graphic ) signals in the so-called gamma band 
(frequencies between 40 and 60 Hz) coming from distant cortical areas .It can be described as an 
interpretation of the sensorial stimuli on the basis of available algorithms, through a Bayes 
inference. 
Precisely, calling h (h= hypothesis) the interpretative hypotheses in presence of a 
sensorial stimulus d (d=datum), the Bayes inference selects the most plausible hypothesis h*,that 
determines the motor reaction, exploiting a memorized algorithm P(d|h), that represents the 
conditional probability that a datum d be the consequence of an hypothesis h. 
The P(d|h) have been learned during our past; they represent the equipment whereby a cognitive 
agent faces the world. By equipping a robot with a convenient set of P(d|h), we expect a sensible 
behavior. 
The second moment, (B),entails a comparison between two apprehensions (A) acquired at different 
times, coded in a given language and recalled by the memory. If, in analogy with (A), we call d the 
code of the second apprehension and h* the code of the first one, now- at variance with (A)- h* is 
already given; instead, the relation P(d|h) which connects them must be retrieved;  it represents the 
conformity between d and h*, that is, the best interpretation of d in the light of h*. 
Thus, in linguistic operations, we compare two successive pieces of the text and extract the 
conformity of the second one on the basis of the first one. This is very different from (A), where 
there is no problem of conformity but of plausibility of h* in view of a motor reaction. 
Let us make two examples: a rabbit perceives a rustle behind a hedge and it runs away, without 
investigating whether it was a fox or just a blow of wind. 
On the contrary, to catch the meaning of the 4-th verse of a poem, we must recover the 3-d verse of 
that same poem, since we do not have a-priori algorithms to provide a satisfactory answer. 
Once the judgment, that is, the P(d|h) binding the codes of the two linguistic pieces in the best way, 
has been built, it becomes a memorized resource to which to recur whenever that text is presented 
again. It has acquired the status of the pre-learned algorithms that rule (A) 
However-at variance with mechanized resources- whenever we re-read the same poem, we can 
grasp new meanings that enrich the previous judgment P(d|h). As in any exposure to a text (literary, 
musical, figurative) a re-reading increases our understanding. 
(B) requires about 3 seconds and entails self-consciousness, as the agent who expresses the 
judgment must be aware that the two successive apprehensions are both under his/her scrutiny and 
it is up to him/her to extract the mutual relation.[Arecchi, 2007, Doyia et al. ] 
At variance with (A), (B) does not presuppose an algorithm, but rather it builds a new one through 
an inverse Bayes procedure [Arecchi2007]. This construction of a new algorithm is a sign of 
creativity and decisional freedom 
Here the question emerges: can we provide a computing machine with the (B) capacity, so that it 
can emulate a human cognitive agent, as expected in the Turing test? .The answer is NOT, because 
(B) entails non-algorithmic jumps, insofar as the inverse Bayes procedure generates an ad hoc 
algorithm, not available previously.  
 The scientific endeavor can not be carried on by an AI (artificial intelligence ) device,  since it 
entails a linguistic step, as shown in Fig,3. Fig.4 explains why Galileo’s program provides 
certainties, rather than probabilistic expectations.  
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Fig.3-The scientific program is a linguistic task. Galileo’s approach consists of  extracting  
mathematical features; it implies a linguistic operation, according to Fig.2 
                              
Fig.4-Once the   object under investigation is reduced to a collection of mathematical features, one 
applies millennia of mathematical wisdom and predicts the future behavior . 
 
 
2-The brain operations - Role of homoclinic chaos 
Let us introduce “deterministic chaos”.[Arecchi,2004 b] Since Poincaré (1890) we know that a 
dynamical system is extremely sensitive to the initial conditions. That yields the so called “butterfly 
effect” whereby a tiny shift in the initial conditions yields a large difference in course of time . 
Precisely, a difference of initial conditions induces a divergence of the  dynamical trajectories in 
course of time. In the case of a meteo dynamical model, accounting for most atmospheric features 
(wind, pressure, humidity,etc) but neglecting the motion of a butterfly wing could lead to a wrong 
prediction(from sunny to rainy).Loss of the initial information occurs over  a time whose inverse 
is called K(Kolmogorov entropy). In the meteo model such amay be days, in a dynamical model 
of the solar system it takes millions of years 
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We call geometric chaos the above trajectory divergence.  
Another type of chaos, that we call temporal chaos, consists of regular closed orbits that however 
repeat at irregular times (Fig.5). 
 
 
Fig.5-Homoclinic chaos; the dynamic trajectory is a closed orbit starting from S (saddle point) and 
returning to it. Projecting on a single direction, we observe spikes P repeating in time. The time 
separation between two spike occurrences depends on the relations between α and , thus it can be 
controlled by a voltage applied to S, as the signal χ . 
 
A single neuron in the brain undergoes temporal chaos and its electrical output consists of a train of 
spikes (each one high 100mV and lasting 3 ms). The minimal inter-spike separation is 3 ms; the 
average separation is 25 ms in the so-.called band of the EEG(electro-encephalo-gram). 
A neuron communicates with other neurons in two ways [Arecchi,2004 a, Singer, Womelsdorf. & 
Fries]: 
-either directly , by coupling its spike train to another neuron via an electric line called axon, 
-or indirectly, by building with nearby neurons a local potential (detectable as an EEG signal) and 
providing a signal χ to a distant neuron, that consequently re-adjusts its firing rate. 
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Fig.6- .Direct coupling of two neurons by synchronized spike trains; synchronization missed after 
t for an extra-spike in the upper train. 
Fig.6 shows the direct synchronization of two trains over a time t. The neurons involved in the 
coupling are confined in a thin layer of the brain (thickness 2 mm) called the cortex. Groups of 
nearby neurons contribute to a common task forming a specialized area that builds global 
interactions with other areas (Fig.7). 
The areas are visualized via the amount of oxygenated blood required by a working region and 
visualized by f- MRI(functional magnetic resonance imaging). 
multisensory interactions
will combine into a unified pattern involving frontal cortex, temporo-
parietal regions as well as unimodal cortices: A = auditory cortex; 
V = visual cortex; M= higher-order multisensory regions; F = prefrontal 
cortex
 
Fig.7- Topology of specialized cortical areas , each one being active as a large collection of 
synchronized neurons; mutual communication occurs via EEG signals 
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Fig.  8- . Competition of two cortical areas with different degrees of synchronization 
Fig.8 visualizes the competition between two neuron groups I and II fed by the same sensorial 
(bottom-up) stimulus, but perturbed (top-down) by different interpretational stimuli provided by the 
long term memory. I wins, as the corresponding top-down stimulus succeeds in 
synchronizing the neuron pulses of this group better than  in group II. This means that, 
over a time interval Δt, neurons of I sum up coherently their signals, whereas neurons of II are 
not co-ordinated, hence yielding a smaller sum. As a consequence a reader GWS (= global 
workspace, name given to the cortical area where signals from different areas converge; it is located 
in area F of Fig.7) reads within Δt a sum signal overcoming a suitable threshold and hence eliciting 
a motor response [Dehaene]. 
Thus, the winning interpretation driving the motor system is that provided by I. 
What represented in Fig. 8 models the mechanism (A) common to any animal with a brain. 
 
 
4-Perception as a Bayes inference  
Neurosciences hypothesize a collective agreement of crowds of cortical neurons through the mutual 
synchronization of trains of electrical pulses (spikes) emitted individually by each neuron [ Singer 
et al., Dehaeneet al.] .The neuroscientific approach is summarized in Fig.8. 
However, a global description of the above process can be carried on in probabilistic terms, without 
recurring to the details of the process. 
In 1763, Thomas Bayes, looking for a reliable strategy to win games, elaborated the following 
probabilistic argument[Bayes]. Let us formulate a manifold of hypotheses h about the initial 
situation of a system, attributing to each hypothesis a degree of confidence expressed by an a priori 
probability 
                                                                    P(h). 
Any hypothesis, introduced as input into a model of evolution, generates data. Let us assume that 
we know the model and, hence, can evaluate the probability of the data conditioned by a specific 
hypothesis h; we write it as  
                                                             P(data|h). 
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The model is like an instruction to a computer, thus we call it algorithm; it generates different data 
for different h. If then we perform a measurement and evaluate the probability 
                                                          P(data)  
of the data, we must conclude that there is an hmore plausible than the other ones, precisely the one 
thatmaximizes the probability conditioned by the data  
                                                   P(h|data), 
that we call the a posteriori probability of h and denote as h* . 
This procedure is encapsulated in the formula, or theorem,of Bayes, that is 
 
                                    P(h*)=P(h|data) = P(h) [P(data|h)/P(data)] 
 
To summarize, the a posteriori probability of h, conditioned by the observed data, is given by the 
product of the a priori probability of h, times the probability P(data|h) of the data conditioned by a 
given h, that we call the model, and divided by the probability P(data), based on a previous class of 
trials.(Fig.9) 
 
                       
                    Fig.9 Bayes inference 
Fig.10 summarizes the whole perception procedure, that is initiated by an external stimulus and 
concluded by a motor reaction. 
. Successive applications of the theorem yield an increasing plausibility of h*; it is like climbing a 
mountain of probabilities along its maximum slope, up to the peak. After each measurement of the 
data and consequent evaluation of the a posteriori h*, we reformulate a large number of new a priori 
h relative to the new situation, and so on.(Fig.11). . Notice that Darwinian evolution by mutation 
and successive selection of the best fit mutant is a sequential implementation of Bayes theorem. 
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Fig. 10-Starting with a large number of presumed hypotheses h, the occurrence of the data selects 
the h* that satisfies the above relation and drives a suitable reaction. 
 
                  
 
Fig.11.Recursive application of Bayes is equivalent to climbing a probability mountain, guided by 
the Model ,that is, the conditional probability that an hypothesis generates a datum. 
This strategy is common e.g. to Darwin evolution and to Sherlock Holmes criminal investigation; 
since the algorithm is unique, it can be automatized in a computer program (expert system) 
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4- Linguistic operations as inverse Bayes 
 
Bayes
MEANING
INFORMATION
complexity, semantic----
(multiple models)
complexity, algorithmic
(single model)
creativity= swap of model
Climbing up a single peak is a non-semiotic procedure
ON THE CONTRARY  
Jumping to other peaks is a creativity act, implying a holistic 
comprehension of the surrounding world (semiosis)
 
Fig.12.Comparison of two different complexities, namely, i)the algorithmic C. , corresponding to 
the bit length of the program that enables the expert system to a recursive Bayes; and ii)semantic 
C., corresponding to the occurrence of different models  
 
In Fig.11 the recursive application of Bayes using the same algorithm- or model- is visualized as 
climbing a probability mountain. The bit length of the algorithm is the Algorithmic Complexity of 
the cognitive task. 
However, in everyday life we experience jumps toward different algorithms, that means going to 
climb different mountains (Fig.12). The associated multiplicity of choices corresponds to attributing 
different meanings to the input data; the number of alternative choices will be called Semantic 
Complexity. 
This swap of the model is a creative jump proper of language operations. 
It is the root of Goedel-1931 incompleteness theorem and Turing-1936 halting problem for a 
computer, as discussed in a previous paper [Arecchi2012]. 
Altogether different from (A) is the situation for (B), that- implying the comparison between 
different apprehensions coded in the same language (literary, musical, figurative, etc.)- represents 
an activity exclusively human. 
In fact, the second moment (B) entails the comparison of two apprehensions acquired at different 
times, coded in the same language and recalled by the memory. 
(B) lasts around 3 sec; it requires self-consciousness, since the agent who performs the comparison 
must be aware that the two non simultaneous apprehensions are submitted to his/her scrutiny in 
order to extract a mutual relation. 
 
At variance with (A), (B) does not presuppose an algorithm but it rather builds a new one through an 
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inverse Bayes procedure introduced by Arecchi  [Arecchi,2007]. This construction of a new 
algorithm is the source of creativity and decisional freedom. 
Language indeed permits an infinite use of finite resources [Humboldt]. 
It is the missing step in Turing’s claim that human intelligence can be simulated by a machine 
[Turing]. 
The first scientist who explored the cognitive relevance of the 3sec interval has been Ernst 
Pöppel [Pöppel ]. 
This new temporal segment has been little explored so far. All the so-called “neural correlates of 
consciousness”(NCC) are in fact electrical (EEG) or functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) tests 
of a neuronal recruitment stimulating a motor response through a GWS (see Fig.8); therefore they 
refer to (A). In such a case, rather than consciousness , one should call it perceptual awareness, that 
we have in common with brainy animals. 
                         
 
Fig. 13-The inverse Bayes procedure that occurs in linguistic endeavors, whereby a previous piece 
of a text is retrieved by the short term memory and compared with the next one: the appropriate 
conditional probability is no longer stored permanently but it emerges as a result of the comparison 
(judgmentand consequent decision). 
 
Fig.13 shows how an inverse Bayes procedure provides the best comparisons of two successive 
pieces of a linguistic text, thus generating a judgment. 
While in perception we compare sensorial stimuli with memories of past experiences, in judgment 
we compare a piece of a text coded in a specific language (literary, musical, figurative) with the 
preceding piece, recalled via the short term memory. Thus we do not refer to an event of our past 
life, but we compare two successive pieces of the same text.  
Such an operation requires that: 
i) The cognitive agent be aware that he/she is the same examiner of the two pieces under 
scrutiny; 
ii) The interpretation of the second piece based upon the previous one implies to have selected 
the most appropriate meanings of the previous piece in order to grant the best conformity 
(from a technical point of view, this conformity is what in the philosophy of cognition 
of Thomas Aquinas was defined as truth= adaequatio intellectus et rei (loosely 
translated as : conformity between the intellectual expectation and the object under 
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scrutiny) 
 
In Fig. 10 we have generically denoted as top-down the bunch of inner resources ( emotions, 
attention) that, upon the arrival of a bottom-up stimulus, are responsible for selecting the model 
P(d|h) that infers the most plausible interpretation h* driving the motor response. The focal 
attention mechanisms can be explored through the so-called NCC (Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness) [Koch] related to EEG measurements that point the cortical areas where 
there is intense electrical activity producing spikes, or to f-MRI (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging) that shows the cortical areas with large activity which need the influx of oxygenated 
blood. 
Here one should avoid a current confusion. The fact that a stimulus elicits some emotion has 
NOTHING to do with the judgment that settles a linguistic comparison. As a fact, NCC does not 
reveal self-consciousness, but just the awareness of an external stimulus to which one must react. 
Such awareness is common to animals, indeed many tests of NCC are done on laboratory animals. 
 
It is then erroneous to state that a word isolated from its context has an aesthetical quality because 
of its musical or evocative power. In the same way, it is erroneous to attribute an autonomous value 
to a single spot of color in a painting independently from the comparison with the neighboring 
areas. All those “excitations” observed by fMRI refer to emotions related to apprehension and are 
inadequate to shed light on the judgment process. 
 
 The different semantic values that a word can take are associated with different emotions stored in 
the memory with different codes (that is, spike trains). Among all the different values, the cognitive 
operation “judgment” selects that one that provides the maximum synchronization with the 
successive piece. 
 
Thus emotions are necessary but not sufficient to establish a judgment. On the other hand, emotions 
are necessary and sufficient to establish the apprehension as they represent the algorithms of the 
direct Bayes inference. This entails a competition in GWS (Fig.8) ,where the winner is 
the most plausible one; whereas in the judgment- once evoked the panoply of meanings 
to be attributed to the previous piece- these meanings do not compete in a threshold process, but 
they must be compared with the code of the next word in order to select the best interpretation. 
 
Recent new terms starting with neuro-( as e.g. neuro-ethics, neuro-aesthetics, neuro-economy, 
neuro-theology) smuggle as shear emotional reactions decisions that instead are based on 
judgments. The papers using those terms overlook the deep difference between apprehensions and 
judgments. 
 
A very successful neurological  research line deals with mirror neurons, that is, neurons that 
activate in subjects (humans or higher animals) observing another subject performing a specific 
action, and hence stimulate mimetic reactions [Rizzolatti]. Here too, we are in presence of 
mechanisms (empathy) limited to the emotional sphere, that is, very useful for formulating an 
Apprehension, but  not a Judgment. 
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5-Two different hermeneutics, that is, interpretations of cognitive data 
 
Fig.14 shows how a cognitive agent A reads an object B. The CIRCLE refers to a Bayes cognition, 
whereby an algorithm is taken as necessary and sufficient to generate knowledge of B. 
Whenever A reconsiders B, he/she finds the same B already memorized. 
On the contrary, expressing the knowledge in a language and comparing successive pieces by 
inverse Bayes, entails an increase  of details of B (B1,B2, etc.) that improve the cognition of the 
agent (A1, A2, etc). 
 
. 
 
Fig.14- Two kinds of interpretation of a text, or hermeneutics, namely, the 
CIRCLE, whereby the interpreter A attributes a finite and fixed set of meanings to the text B, and 
the COIL, whereby A captures some particular aspects of B and- based on that information- A 
approaches again the text B discovering new meanings. The novel insight provided at each coil is 
an indication of how language provides new semantic apertures, 
 
As for the CIRCLE, in information science, an ontology is a formal definition of the properties, and 
mutual relationships of the entities that exist for a particular domain of discourse. An ontology 
lists the variables needed for some set of computations and establishes the relationships between 
them. For instance, the booklet of the replacement parts of a brand of car is the ontology of that car. 
The fields of artificial intelligence create ontologies to limit complexity and to organize 
information. The ontology can then be applied to problem solving. Nothing is left out; 
we call this cognitive approach “ finitistic” as  no new insight is provided by repeated trials.  
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. 
On the contrary, in any human linguistic endeavor (be it literary, or musical or figurative) A starts 
building a provisional interpretation A1 of the text ; whenever A returns to B, he/she has already 
some interpretational elements to start with, and from there A progresses beyond , grasping new 
aspects B2, B3…and hence going to A2 and so on (COIL). To carry on a COIL program, we do not 
need a large amount of resources; language makes an infinite use of finite resources [Humboldt]. 
 
The COIL hermeneutics describes also the inter-personal dialogue. If the object B of cognition is a 
human person as A, then the changes B1, B2, etc are not only due to an increased knowledge by A, 
but also to an activity of B who re-adjusts his/her relation with A. 
Thus, if B is another human subject, then B undergoes similar hermeneutic updates as A; this is a 
picture of the dialogical exchange between two human beings.(persons). 
 
 
 
6-Conclusions- Two aspects of linguistic creativity 
We conclude by stressing two well known aspects of linguistic creativity. First, if we start a 
linguistic endeavor , a wealth of possible situations emerge , giving rise to ambiguous behaviors as 
it occurs in most products of human creativity, that –like the Etruscan Chimera- display apparently 
contradictory behaviors, from Ulysses to Dom Quixote (Fig.15). The onset of Chimeras is 
explained in Fig.16as the lack of an external referent B.  
 
Fig.15-A linguistic action that proceeds from a known piece toward an unknown one is like the 
Etruscan Chimera: it can generate mutually conflicting behaviors , as it occurs in most characters 
,from Ulysses to Dom Quixote. When instead the linguistic comparison regards two observed items 
(as it occurs in reading the verses of a Poem, but also in scientific observations), then we really 
increase our personal knowledge with an element of reality. 
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Fig.16- How chimeras emerge in any linguistic creation 
Altogether different is the what takes place when  the language is interpreting scientific 
observations, indeed , the repeated comparison extracts elements of reality, as hinted in the COIL 
hermeneutics. 
Applying our hermeneutics to the scientific program, we have two possible approaches. As  the size 
of the observed world increases from a few particles to many , within  a universal scientific 
description  associated with a fixed-algorithm (as an AI tool would operate) we witness an 
exponential increase of the size C of the computation (that we have already called the algorithmic 
complexity) as well as a reduction of the time interval  over which predictions are reliable, that is, 
an increase of the Kolmogorov entropy K=1/(Fig.17) 
A more efficient scientific program consists of linguistic comparisons of different situations, with 
the help of inverse Bayes inference, applying non-algorithmic jumps as the horizontal lines of Fig. 
12. Such a change of paradigm [Kuhn] leads to novel theories with low C and K, called effective 
science [Hartmann]. A very familiar example is the formulation of Maxwell’s electromagnetic 
equations, unifying electric, magnetic and optical phenomena. 
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Fig.17- Normal science vs. paradigm shift effective science [Hartmann, Kuhn]-. Let C be the bit 
length of the algorithm and K the Kolmogorov entropy, i.e., the inverse of the time beyond which 
the initial information is lost by dynamical chaos. A simple computer program that evaluates 
Kepler’s orbits, as BACON, has small C and K. As the physical system gets richer, both C and K 
increase and a scientific search carried on by an AI system would be affected by higher and higher 
C and K. However, a linguistic actor as a human scientist can act by a ” jump of paradigm”, that 
is, change code and introduce a new scientific theory (effective description;) with low C and K. 
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